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Abstract:  
In this paper we examine whether variations in the level of public capital 
across Spain‟s Provinces affected productivity levels over the period 1996-2005. The 
analysis is motivated by contemporary urban economics theory, involving a 
production function for the competitive sector of the economy („industry‟) which 
includes the level of composite services derived from „service‟ firms under 
monopolistic competition. The outcome is potentially increasing returns to scale 
resulting from pecuniary externalities deriving from internal increasing returns in the 
monopolistic competition sector. We extend the production function by also making  
(log) labour efficiency  a function of (log) total public capital stock and (log) human 
capital stock, leading to a simple and empirically tractable reduced form linking 
productivity level to density of employment, human capital and public capital stock. 
The model is further extended to include technological externalities or spillovers 
across provinces. Using panel data methodology, we find significant elasticities for 
total capital stock and for human capital stock, and a significant impact for 
employment density. The finding that the effect of public capital is significantly 
different from zero, indicating that it has a direct effect even after controlling for 
employment density, is contrary to some of the earlier research findings which leave 
the question of the impact of public capital unresolved. 
 
JEL Code: C21, R11, R12. 
Keywords: Public capital, urban economics, spatial econometrics.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One way that the World‟s current economic malaise can be addressed is 
by an enhanced level of investment by Governments that is focussed on the 
public infrastructure. Of course, the impact of such a policy needs to be 
evaluated in order to see whether it is cost effective. This paper contributes the 
literature on policy impact evaluation by examining the extent to which public 
infrastructure investment can potentially enhance productivity, using the 
recent history of investment in the Spanish regions as a guide to likely impacts 
elsewhere. There is no single approach to evaluating the impact of public 
infrastructure on productivity growth, and four main approaches have 
appeared in the literature, namely the cost function or dual approach, 
autoregressive vectors (VAR) models, frontier analysis and the production 
function approach. As will become evident, our approach comes closest to a 
production function approach, but is sufficiently different to be considered to 
be a fifth approach to the problem. 
Under the dual approach most of the analyses show that public 
investment reduces entrepreneur costs1. However, evidence using VAR models 
is more ambiguous. For instance the papers by Flores de Frutos (1998) and 
Batina (1999) show a positive effect, whereas Otto and Voss (1996) and Voss 
(2002) find a negative impact. Application of frontier analysis to the Spanish 
case suggests a positive effect2. But the most frequently applied approach is 
                                                        
1 Bosca et al (2002), Moreno et al (2002), Avilés et al (2003), and Cohen and Morrison 
(2004), Matmazakis (2007). 
2 Maudos et al (1998), Martín and Suárez (2000), Pedraja et al (2002), Salinas- Jiménez 
(2004) and Delgado and Álvarez (2007). 
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based on the neoclassical production functions, commencing with Ratner‟s 
(1983) analysis of the relation between infrastructure and private productivity 
in the US economy. Ratner introduced public capital stock as an input in the 
aggregate production function, and found that it had a small but significant 
effect on the level of production. Subsequently Aschauer (1989a) also found a 
similar (albeit larger) effect, and by breaking public capital stock down into its 
constituent parts, he was able to show that the components with the biggest 
impact on productivity were transport infrastructure, energy and water 
supply. Subsequently, Aschauer (1989b) estimated a panel data model for 
seven industrialized countries, obtaining similar results under a first 
differences specification. However Evans and Karras (1994), again using panel 
data for seven countries, found that the effect of infrastructure on economic 
growth differed according to the set-up of their model.  
From a regional perspective, much of the analysis has been carried out 
for the American states and for the Spanish regions3. In the case of the US, 
Munell (1990a) estimated an amplified production function, with panel data 
for the American states. When the model was specified with the variables in 
levels and without fixed effects, the impact of public capital on productivity 
was positive and significant, but smaller than the Aschauer (1989a) estimate. 
Building on this, Munell (1990b) broke down public capital stock into its 
different types, showing that the biggest impacts were attributable to road and 
water supply infrastructures. In contrast, García-Milá et al (1996), who 
                                                        
3 There are very few countries where regional public investment data are available, one 
exception are Germany and Italy, where recently Marrocu and Paci (2010) obtained a positive 
and significant but variable public investment effect on production.  
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estimated, for the period 1970-1983, a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
data for the 48 American states, found no relation between public capital 
stock and productivity given the presence of region fixed effects. Likewise 
Holtz-Eakin (1994) concluded that, once fixed regional effects are introduced, 
public capital stock is not significant. 
With regard to the Spanish regions, most papers suggest a positive 
effect, for example, Marquez et al (2009), De la Fuente (2008), Cantos et al 
(2005), Ezcurra et al (2005), Moreno et al (2002), Boscá et al (2002), Mas et 
al (1996), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), Flores de Frutos et al (1998) 
and Gómez-Antonio and Fingleton (2010). However some papers, such as 
Gorostiaga (1999) and Gonzalez-Páramo and Martinez (2003) do not find a 
significant effect of public capital stock on economic growth. One of the 
reasons suggested in the literature for the inconclusiveness of the results is 
that many analyses do not take into account the existence of spillover effects. 
Negative as well as positive inter-regional spatial spillovers may occur, for 
instance Mas et al (1996), using the production function approach, and Avilés 
et al (2003), based on duality theory, find positive spillovers. Pereira and 
Roca-Sagales (2003), applying a vector autoregressive model, show similar 
results. Moreno and López-Bazo (2007) interestingly obtain a negative 
spillover effect due to transport infrastructure that counterbalances its 
positive effect on manufacturing productivity within each region. The 
existence of negative spillovers suggests that a region‟s public capital raises its 
comparative advantage, thereby attracting production factors from other 
regions.  
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With regard to the results obtained in countries other than Spain, 
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) provide no evidence of spatial infrastructure 
spillovers in the US context. However, Owyong and Thangavelu (2001) find 
that US public capital positively affects Canadian productivity. Cohen and 
Morrison (2004) and Bronzini and Piselli (2009), also find significant positive 
spatial spillovers for the US, and Italy, respectively. However, Boarnet (1998) 
using data for California‟s counties, finds that the output of counties is 
negatively affected by neighbouring counties‟ infrastructure, likewise Sloboda 
and Yao (2008) for the US, and Pereira and Andraz (2006) for Portuguese 
regions. 
To summarise the above, the literature on the effects of public 
infrastructure is inconclusive, although there is a general consensus on the 
need for a certain level of public infrastructural provision, the results obtained 
differ substantially once this level is achieved. More recent studies have 
partially discredited the results obtained in early research. Many researchers 
agree that the apparently positive impact of public capital stock might be due 
to inadequate model specifications which cause spurious relations or fail to 
appropriately control for region or country heterogeneity.  
The period analysed in this paper is the decade from 1996 to 2005. We 
avoid analysing earlier data because of the substantial transformation of the 
Spanish economy over the longer period, which makes model specification 
particularly difficult. For instance, in a fixed effects panel, the fixed effects 
may not capture some variables that vary over time given a longer time period, 
leading to omitted variable bias. We thus restrict our period of analysis to a 
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shorter time-span during which we have greater confidence that our model 
will be appropriate.   
As mentioned above, our approach differs from the four approaches 
that can be found in the literature, and can be seen as a fifth approach that 
extends the public capital literature by basing the evaluation of public 
infrastructure on a different theoretical paradigm to that which dominates the 
literature, namely neoclassical constant returns to scale technology. Our 
model is rooted in contemporary Urban Economics theory, which provides 
formal general equilibrium solutions with each agent solving a clearly defined 
economic problem within the context of a monopolistic competition market 
structure. One of the most distinctive aspects of this theory is the possibility of 
increasing returns to scale. By incorporating imperfect competition, 
increasing returns and externalities in the form of market interdependence, 
there is an added realism in these models, without compromising rigour and 
the logic of a closed general equilibrium approach. To our knowledge this 
theory has not previously underpinned attempts to test the impact of public 
capital. 
In addition to the direct effect on productivity of the mechanisms 
embodied in our urban economics theory, we also allow for the direct within-
province effects of variations in worker efficiency, and also for spillovers in 
efficiency levels across provinces, with efficiency depending on the level of 
public capital and also the level of human capital. Spillover effects operating 
across provinces are technological externalities that could also play a key role 
in regional economic performance, since changes in one region may affect 
over regions, cascading across the whole country and rebounding back to the 
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initial province. These impacts might be positive or negative. For example, 
changes in one region could affect production in other regions by raising the 
comparative advantage of that region compared with others, and could 
therefore attract production factors from other locations where output or 
productivity might as a consequence diminish. On the other hand there are 
reasons to believe that capital investment in neighbouring provinces might 
have a positive impact on productivity within a given province as it might 
enhance connections such as roads, railways or airports. 
Although our approach differs somewhat from that of the previous 
literature, nevertheless our main conclusions are in line with what has been 
found previously for the Spanish economy. We find that, controlling for inter-
province heterogeneity, human capital and spillover between provinces, public 
capital, in our case working via labour efficiency, has a significant positive 
direct impact on the level of GDP per worker. The presence of the spillover 
effect enables us to avoid model misspecification which would otherwise occur 
if we chose to ignore spatial interaction, and therefore we are able to obtain 
unbiased estimates and also take into account the total impact effect. Within 
the positive spillover of labour efficiency, there may be a negative spillover 
effect of public capital, as has been detected in some other papers, but our 
model set-up does not allow us to identify this specifically and it is not a focus 
for our investigation in this paper. The positive spillover effect we identify is 
the net effect of the spillover of public and human capital spillover and of 
other unmodelled factors captured by model disturbances.  
The paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 specify the 
theoretical background of the model and derive the specific reduced form that 
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is going to be estimated. Section 3 details the data set and the data sources 
utilised for the estimation procedure. Section 4 comments on the main results 
obtained in the estimation and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
At the core of this model is the concept of increasing returns to scale, 
which has become popular in recent years within both urban and geographical 
economics (Rivera-Batiz, 1988; Abdel-Rahman and Fujita, 1990; Quigley, 
1998; Fujita et al 1999). All of this literature allows increasing returns in the 
region or city while at the same time the decision problem for each actor is 
explicitly stated as one of profit or utility maximization. Due to the increase in 
diversity or variety in producer inputs, increasing density of economic activity 
can yield external scale economies, even though firms are just earning normal 
profits. The monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit-Stiglitz allows 
an equilibrium solution in the context of competitive producers but with 
increasing returns to the economy as a whole. The approach adopted differs 
from pro-competitive effects leading to agglomeration. Porter (1990, 1998) 
suggests that competition causes firms to be better innovators or faster 
adopters of others' innovations than they otherwise would be, which enhances 
the growth rate. To ensure full access to competitors‟ spillovers, an optimal 
strategy is for firms in the same sector to cluster together. A similar 
competitive stimulus is provided by Jacobs (1969) externalities, but based on 
spillovers between sectors. 
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The model in this paper, following Rivera-Batiz (1988) and Abdel-
Rahman and Fujita (1990), and Ciccone and Hall (1996), considers two 
sectors, industry (including manufacturing and traded services) and producer 
services and follows the arguments of some of the urban economics literature. 
The non-traded producer service sector (hereafter „services‟) comprises local 
services that are not traded in national or international markets and are 
identified as the array of input requirements that industry demands, such as 
repair and maintenance of all kinds, transportation and communication 
services, advertising, engineering and legal support, etc. We assume a 
monopolistic competition market structure for services4, which is a direct 
result of the fact that the market for services are generally highly competitive, 
and face relatively minor barriers to entry and exit, while at the same time 
consumers and producers have highly specialized demands making each 
service sector firm differentiated with respect to the others. So firms in the 
service sector are assumed to be typically numerous, small, independent and 
heterogeneous. Industry on the other hand is assumed to have a competitive 
                                                        
4 The Dixit-Stiglitz theory of monopolistic competition provides the reason why an increase in 
service labour maps to an increase in service variety, rather than more of the same variety. 
Monopolistic competition envisages a large number of services firms producing differentiated 
services and firms freely entering the sector until profits go to zero. The existence of fixed 
costs means that firms prefer to concentrate on a single variety and reap internal economies of 
scale; there is no advantage in a variety‟s production being split between two or more firms. 
On the other hand if there were no fixed costs, average costs would not decrease with 
increasing output so no internal economies of scale would be realized. Since each firm is the 
producer of its own differentiated services, the ensuing monopoly power allows prices to be a 
mark up on marginal cost. The number of firms supplying services is an endogenous variable 
in the model instead of being an ad-hoc restriction. There is an equilibrium level of output and 
therefore equilibrium labour requirement per service firm that is a constant, and as will be 
stated later we have an equilibrium number of firms. These equilibrium values depend on 
exogenous parameters. 
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market structure, and demands a wide array of different types of services 
performing highly specialized tasks. 
In order to get to an empirically tractable reduced form we follow 
closely the presentation of the model given in Fingleton (2001, 2003, 2004). 
First we derive the reduced form linking output (Q) to the intensity of activity 
in a unit area given by the total labour force (N) and land (L). Capital, in the 
form of public capital or human capital comes through via its impact on 
labour efficiency. By substituting the level of composite services I into the 
Cobb-Douglas production function we obtain the industry production 
technology. In this the level of industry output (Q) is a function of the input of 
industry labour M, I and L. Note that industry is competitive, with constant 
returns to scale. 
1 1( )Q M I L                                                (1) 
For simplicity the level of composite services is determined by the CES 
production function. This is what determines the level of composite services I. 
It is not simply the sum of each firm‟s output; it is more, depending on the 
number of separate varieties. The assumption is that there is a 'love of variety', 
which means that the varieties produced by differentiated firms results in a 
higher level of composite services than would otherwise be the case from firms 
with identical, perfectly substitutable, products.  
                                                       (2) 
In (2) i(d) is the “typical” output of a service variety, and there are D varieties. 
The level of monopoly power in the service sector is given by the exogenous 
I i d d
d
D









 ( )
1
1



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parameter µ5. The higher µ is the less one service substitutes for others and 
the more monopoly power the producer of that service has. As µ increases, we 
see rising monopoly power and falling elasticity of substitution. More 
monopoly power enhances the level of composite services providing an input 
to industry output. As µ falls back towards 1, the level of composite services 
approaches the number of firms times the equilibrium level of output per firm. 
Since we assume a very large number of varieties we approximate the 
continuous integral by the discrete summation. At equilibrium i(d) is a 
constant across all varieties and therefore we can reduce the summation to a 
product as follows:  
                                   (3) 
Broadly speaking, services are relatively labour intensive. We thus assume, for 
simplicity that each firm producing composite service uses only labour as an 
input whose requirements are given by  
( )iL ai d s
                                                                   (4) 
In (4), s represent the fixed labour input requirement and a the marginal 
input requirement. Following the Chamberlinian framework, the technology 
used by all firms is considered identical, implying that a and s are the same for 
all the composite service sector firms.  
                                                        
5 This is the substitution parameter of the CES production function, which determines the 
elasticity of substitution, the price elasticity of demand, and the internal returns to scale given 
by the average cost to marginal cost for producer services in equilibrium. 
I i d Di d D i d
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Given the simplified form in equation (3), we substitute for I and use the 
equilibrium values for the number of varieties D and M to obtain the 
relationship between Q, N and L. We will write the equation in terms of 
production per unit area, so we restrict L = 1, eliminating land as an input 
since : By doing this we are implicitly including the effect of congestion 
in the equation, since by eliminating land production will be less than it would 
otherwise be.  
 
 
 
If we assume that the economy is at a competitive equilibrium and workers are 
paid the value of their marginal product, at equilibrium the wage rate (w) 
equal to the marginal product of M labour is given by  
     (5) 
If we assume also that the share of Q going to all labour (N, equal to industry 
plus services) is given by , from standard Cobb-Douglas theory, we have 
wages (considered to be the same as for industry) times number of workers as 
a share of Q is  
  (6) 
The assumption here is that the inputs are (all types of) labour 
(coefficient ), capital and land and the marginal product of each input 
11 1 
1( )Q M I  
I D i d  ( )
 
1
( )Q M D i d
   
  
dQ Q
w
dM M

 

wN
Q


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(wages, returns on capital and land rents) are given by the respective 
derivatives, and the shares are the marginal products times the amounts (of 
labour, capital, land) as a proportion of total output Q. The marginal product 
of all types of labour is  
     (7) 
From this it follows that  
  (8) 
Hence service workers (N-M) as a share of total workers is .  
At equilibrium all firms are the same size so the number of firms D is 
the total services workforce, , divided by the workers per service firm. 
     (9) 
 So utilising equilibrium values we have: 
                        (10) 
Where: 
                                      (11) 
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Increasing returns to scale are implied by , so from equation (11) it is 
apparent that this will occur if < 1 and µ > 1 provided  is not too small. 
This means that assuming that the loss of production as a result of restricting 
land is not too severe, then we also need differentiated intermediate goods to 
be relevant to the output of the competitive sector (β < 1) and for them to be 
imperfect substitutes for each other (µ > 1) with a degree of monopoly power. 
With a higher enough µ and a low enough β, the production function could 
have increasing returns, where the favourable effect of density outweighs the 
congestion effects. 
In order to move closer to a convenient reduced form, we log-linearize 
equation (7) by taking natural logarithms, hence 
   (12) 
And substituting for Q gives 
 
  (13) 
Assuming the number of labour efficiency units (N) is equal to the total 
employment (E) times the level of efficiency (A), we have 
              (14) 
 
The Level of Efficiency 
In line with Fingleton (2003b) we assume that the level of efficiency 
depends on „within region‟ effects and effects that spillover from 
1 
 
ln ln ln lnw Q N  
ln ln ln ln lnw N N    
1ln ( 1) lnw k N  
1ln ( 1) ln ( 1) lnw k E A     
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„neighbouring‟ regions. Within regions, assume that what is important is the 
level of human capital (H), the level of public capital ( ), plus an 
autonomous rate reflecting “learning by doing” which proceeds regardless of 
the other factors. Regions with relatively better-developed human capital are 
expected to make faster technical progress since human capital facilitates 
research, development and the spillover of knowledge. Likewise superior 
infrastructures (communications, urban facilities, health facilities, etc.) will 
provide the basis for a more efficient labour force. We will utilise as indicator 
of human capital the number of people with high degree level qualifications in 
the region. Public capital measures will be outlined below. The spillover effect 
is determined by the scalar parameter  and by a so-called weights matrix, W, 
which is a square n by n matrix for n regions with cell values denoting the 
strength of interregional interaction, and zeros on the main diagonal. This 
idea of capturing spillovers by means of a weight matrix has been widely used 
in the literature, since the appearance of spatial econometrics techniques, for 
instance under a neoclassical production function approach in Moreno and 
López-Bazo (2007). 
Combining the factors outlined above produces the following 
specification: 
   (15) 
Rearranging, and assuming  is non-singular, we obtain the equivalent 
matrix expression  
   (16) 
K

0 1 1
1
ln ln ln ln
R
i i Pi ir r
r
A b b H b K W A 

    
( )I W
1 1 1ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A I W Xb I W Xb I W            
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In which X is the n by k matrix of right hand side variables (the 
constant, lnH and ) and is an independent and identically distributed 
disturbance term representing measurement error and exogenous shocks to 
the level of efficiency, hence,  
Part of the contribution to area i´s efficiency level is given by row i of 
vector Wln(A) which contains the sum of the weighted efficiency levels of 
other provinces. Note that by making ln(A) depend on Wln(A) and not simply 
on the constant,  and , we capture the totality of the effects 
influencing the efficiency level, including those represented by the random 
shocks. Assuming that , given our preferred (standardised) W matrix (see 
below) it then follows that , with W0 equal to the identity 
matrix I, W2 equal to the matrix product of W and W, and in general Wi equal 
to the matrix product of Wi-1 and W. This means that  
  
This shows that    is equal to the weighted sum of the matrix products6 of 
the matrices  and exogenous variables X and . The log level of 
efficiency  in Province i depends on levels of and  and on shocks 
                                                        
6 Note that as i becomes large, Wi tends to a matrix in which each cell in a column contains the 
same value, columns differ, and each row of Wi is identical. This means that the matrix 
products tend to constant vectors.  
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in regions i,j,k,l,… The actual mechanism causing evidently remote 
interactions is the direct mutual interaction between Province i and its 
„neighbours‟ as defined by W, as indicated by the presence of  in 
equation (15), so that a high (low) efficiency level in Province i causes, and is a 
response to, high (low) efficiency in  „nearby‟ Provinces. 
 
The W  Matrix 
 We considered several alternatives candidates as our preferred weights 
matrix7 W. A first order binary geographical contiguity matrix, in which the 
elements are one when regions share a common border, and zero otherwise8, 
is one option considered. However, while this may prove informative in 
helping to detect localised cross-border spillovers, the main aim of this paper 
is simply to explore the existence of a direct causal effect using a more general 
approach to modelling spatial interaction effects, via W, that would otherwise 
not be present in our specification9. Thus we adopt a W matrix in which the 
value allotted to cell (i,j) is a function10 of the road distances  between the 
                                                        
7 See Fingleton (2003a) for further discussion of alternative assumptions about W. 
8 The elements of the main diagonal are set to zero by convention. 
9 If the basic theoretical model was New Economic Geography rather than our urban 
economics specification, then that would automatically capture spatial dependencies based on 
the size of economies, similar to those embodied in our W matrix as defined below.  
10 This way of capturing interactions weighted by distance is used very often in spatial 
econometrics literature. Fingleton (2003b) hypothesized that the efficiency of the labour force 
employed within an area will be in part determined by commuting, the frequency of which 
falls as distance increases. The rate at which this fall-off in commuting frequency occurs is 
 

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
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capitals of the provinces and the GDP of the region11. Since we subsequently 
standardise the W matrix so that the total in each row sums to 1, the resulting 
standardised matrix will be the same irrespective of whether we include both 
origin and destination provinces in our equation, or whether we just include 
the destination. 
0
1; 2
j
ij
ij
GDP
W i j
d
W i j


 


 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus we also take into account the (economic) size of the (remote) 
province in order to measure the interaction between regions. Economic size 
(GDP) is considered relevant because of the extensive trade and labor market 
that a large and diverse local economy naturally generates.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
embodied within the matrix W, which is determined by the varying rate of decline-with-
distance of commuting in each individual area. So a scalar that reflects the commuting of 
people between different regions is selected to weight distances. As this information is not 
available for the Spanish provinces we weighted using the square to make relation more 
intense as the distance becomes shorter. Additionally, controlling for distance, we assume that 
commuting between provinces will be greater the larger the provincial economies.  
11 We use, somewhat arbitrarily, the GDP in 1971, but other years could have been used with 
very little impact on the outcome.   Using a previous year ensures that the resulting W matrix 
comprises fixed exogenous quantities with no possibility of feedback from the level of 
productivity.  
12 The estimation results were similar when we used different W matrices, the coefficient 
varied slightly and all the signs were as expected from theory. The alternative Ws were 
obtained using 2; 2 and 1; 3.            
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The Reduced Form 
Combining equations 14 and 16 gives 
                       (17) 
On rearranging, making the exogenous variables explicit, and introducing a 
time subscript, we then have  
  (18) 
Consistent estimation of the model is not possible via OLS because of 
the presence of the endogenous variable  on the right hand side of 
equation 18. Moreover we also may have two-way causation involving 
employment density and our dependent variable, with employment density 
increasing (due to migration and enhanced participation rates) as wage rates 
increase. Consequently the composite variable is likely to be 
endogenous also. Note that this composite variable entails a parameter 
restriction because of the presence of . In order to guard against any 
potential inconsistency, our model is estimated using instrumental variables13. 
We assume that human capital and public capital stocks are exogenous, in the 
case of human capital (H) this is because we assume complex determinants of 
educational attainment levels, so that any direct feedback from wage levels 
                                                        
13 Specifically we use the xtivreg available in Stata for estimating panel data models with 
endogenous variables.  
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will be relatively weak. We note that in Spain inter-province migration in 
response to wage differentials is not strong. In the case of Public capital stock 
(K), the assumption is that this is mainly controlled by government policy and 
this is not driven by wage levels. However we also decide to lag these variables 
by one year, guaranteeing exogeneity, since they pre-date the year of analysis. 
These assumptions are supported by model diagnostics, as explained 
subsequently. Over-identification is achieved by additional instrumental 
variables, namely the spatial lags of our exogenous variables together with 
three other measures of public capital, namely social, local and transport 
infrastructure, each again lagged by one year. We subsequently test for the 
legitimate exclusion and validity of these instruments. 
The restriction in equation (18) relating to ρ is caused by the spillover 
of labour efficiency levels between provinces. To take into account this 
constraint we use iterated 2SLS, in which each iteration provides an updated 
value for ρ from the  term which is then used to update 
for the subsequent iteration, until ρ reaches a steady state as in Fingleton 
(2003b). At the first iteration, with no initial estimate for ρ, we assume an 
arbitrary value for ρ = 0. In order to avoid an explosive model, the estimated 
value of ρ should be in the interval , where  and  are the 
largest negative and largest positive eigenvalues of W respectively. This region 
of parameter space is devoid of singular points, but the matrix  
lnW w (ln ln )E W E
1 1
1
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becomes singular at these singular points and beyond14. As explained in 
Fingleton (2003b), because here we are using a standardized W 
matrix,   is a constant.  
 
3. DATA 
Our analysis is based on a panel of data for the decade 1996 to 2005, 
with the individuals comprising the Spanish provinces15 . We confine attention 
to this decade because earlier periods cover an era of substantial economic 
transformation. For example in the 1970s and 1980s the level of government 
capital endowment and economic activity in the Spanish regions was far below 
that typical of most Western European economies, but by the mid-1990s this 
was no longer the case. In 1980 per capita public capital stock endowment was 
only 40% of the average of the European Union, but this figure increased to 
60% in 1990 and reached 89% in 2005. Since Spain joined the European 
Union, there has been a very intensive period of capital investment by the 
Spanish government, and in the decade under study, the ratio of public to 
private capital increased constantly with no perceptible effect due to economic 
cycles. This progress can be explained not only because the large amount of 
                                                        
14 The range of ρ is automatically bounded in Maximum Likelihood estimator but under 2SLS 
can fall outside this stable range and thus encounter singular points. Fortunately, in our 
estimates the estimated ρ lies within the stable bounds. 
15 Spanish provinces correspond to level 3 of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) of EUROSTAT, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The average 
surface of a representative province is 10,120 km2 (range 1,980 km2 to 21,766 km2). 
1( )I W k
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funding received from the structural funds16, as the European Union has 
devoted a substantial fraction of its regional policy funding (known as the 
Structural Funds) to the financing of infrastructure projects, but also as a 
consequence of a higher domestic rate of growth of public investment in 
Spain17. 
We proxy the wage level by the productivity level based on Gross Value 
Added, in thousands of constant (1995) euros, data which were provided by 
Fundación BBVA (La Renta Nacional de España y su Distribución 
Provincial) until 1997, and thereafter by Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorro 
Confederadas (FUNCAS)18 as documented in their “Balance Económico 
Regional”. 
The employment density variable (E) is constructed by dividing the 
total employment, taken from “La Renta Nacional de España y su 
Distribución Provincial”, by the provincial area in square kilometres. Data on 
the geographic area of each province and on population were provided by the 
Office of National Statistics (INE). 
                                                        
16 During the period analyzed Spain has received a sustained increasing amount of funding 
from the Structural and Cohesion funds. During the period 1994-1999 Spain received the 
“Delors II” package and during 2000-2006 the “Agenda 2000” package, receiving a yearly 
average amount of 5.900 and 8.900 million of Euros respectively.  
17 Eurostat reported for the period 1995-2005 an average rate of growth of public investment 
in Spain of 3.37% while in the euro area it was of 2.5%. This higher rate has been sustained 
throughout the decade even though public expenditure has reduced as a proportion of GDP. 
At the same time provincial differences have also been reduced during the period thanks to 
the Structural and Cohesion funds. Most of the Spanish regions were Objective 1 regions and 
received European funds to finance infrastructure projects. 
18 In order to make the Gross Value Added and employment series homogeneous we took the 
rates of growth of the variable in FUNCAS database and applied it to the variable produced by 
FBBVA. Previously we had to transform the valued added into constant euros of 1995 using 
the Implicit Index Prices facilitated by both organisations. 
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 Our human capital variable (H) is the proportion of people in each 
province with higher education, data published in “Human Capital in Spain 
and its distribution by provinces (1977-2007)” by Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE). 
Public capital stock ( ) was taken from the publication “Series 
Históricas de Capital Publico en España y su distribución territorial 1900-
2005” which detailed work done by FBBVA in collaboration with IVIE.  
Our excluded instruments comprise three separate elements of public 
capital stock, namely the transportation infrastructure, the social 
infrastructure stock and the local public capital stock. Transportation includes 
airports, ports, road and railways infrastructures, the social infrastructure 
includes public capital stock in education and health facilities and local public 
capital stock comprises local government infrastructures of various kinds, 
infrastructure relating to water supply and management, plus other residual 
investments. Our assumption is that these have an indirect effect working via 
urbanisation, overall public capital and human capital, but they have no direct 
individual effect on wage levels. We test this exclusion assumption below. Our 
additional instruments are obtained by the matrix product of matrix W and 
the vectors of log public19 and log human capital. As with the exogenous 
variables, all instruments are lagged by one year. 
 
                                                        
19 To satisfy the diagnostic tests described below, the matrix product has been 
dichotomised, being equal to 1 for values exceeding the median value, and 0 otherwise. 
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4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
The results in Table 1 show the estimates20 of the panel model with 
fixed province effects, estimated with endogenous variables  and
, and iterating to satisfy the constraint on the parameter . Our 
analysis rests on the assumption that these two variables are indeed 
endogenous, that lnK and lnH are exogenous, and that the instruments are 
valid. Our diagnostic tests support these assumptions. In our endogeneity 
test21, the null hypothesis is that  and  are exogenous, 
and we reject this null since the test statistic is equal to 31.779, which is highly 
significant when referred to the  distribution, with the two degrees of 
freedom being determined by the fact that there are two variables under test. 
The test of the exogeneity of lnK and lnH is provided by the C statistic22. The 
null hypothesis is that the full set of instruments, including the included 
instruments lnK and lnH are exogenous. Under the null, the test statistic is 
distributed as  (again with two degrees of freedom appropriate for a two 
variable test). Rejecting this null in favour of the alternative would indicate 
that the included „exogenous‟ variables, which are the specific instruments 
being tested, are endogenous, but the test statistic is equal to 2.418, with p-
value equal to 0.2985 in . We therefore fail to reject the null and conclude 
                                                        
20 After having eliminated the spatial lag of log total capital as an instrument, as is necessary 
in order to pass the test of over-identifying restrictions. 
21 This is an option (endog) available within Stata‟s xtivreg2 command (Schaffer, 2010), and 
under conditional homoscedasticity, the test statistic is equal to that provided by a Hausman 
test.  
22 Option orthog in xtivreg2. 
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that we have no evidence that lnK and lnH are endogenous. Our initial 
assumption that lnK and lnH are exogenous has support from our diagnostic 
tests. 
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 Table 1: Fixed effects panel estimates with endogenous regressors (T=10, n=47) 
REGRESSORS Parameter Estimates# 
  Standard error 
Productivity Spatial 
Lag 
 
0.1806355 ** 
(4.28) 
0.0421943 
Employment Density 
 
0.1055751 ** 
(3.40) 
0.0310767 
Public Capital 
lnK 
0.1386397 ** 
(7.26) 
0.0190934 
Human Capital 
lnH 
0.0180546** 
(2.14) 
0.0084188 
R squared 0.5265  
Estimation Method Instrumental variables  
Instruments ln_Kh, ln_Ktot, 
WX_ln_Ktot, WX_ln_Kh, ln_Ktpte, ln_Ksoc, 
ln_Kloc 
 
Notes: 
# z-ratios given in brackets beneath the estimates 
**,* Significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively 
2 Between fixed effects and covariates  
Time sub-indices have been omitted from the table and from the comments to simplify notation. 
 
The test of the overall validity of the instruments is related to the C 
statistic described above. In fact the test statistic, the Sargan-Hansen statistic, 
is calculated twice in order to obtain the C statistic. The C statistic is the 
difference between the Sargan-Hansen test statistic calculated for the full set 
of instruments and the Sargan-Hansen test statistic calculated for the reduced 
set of instruments (that is excluding those that are suspected of being 
lnW w
(ln ln )E W E
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endogenous). The Sargan-Hansen test statistic for the reduced set is equal to 
0.221 (p-value equals 0.6384 in ) and the Sargan-Hansen test statistic for 
the full set of instruments is equal to 2.639, which has a p-value of 0.4507 in 
the appropriate 
 
reference distribution (five excluded instruments minus 
two endogenous variables). The latter provides our test of over-identifying 
restrictions23, with the null being a hypothesis of valid instruments, which is 
not rejected thus indicating that the instruments are appropriate. We would 
reject if instruments are correlated with the disturbances, or if excluded 
instruments should be included in the set of regressors, so that the model is 
misspecified. This provides justification for our exclusion of the instruments 
transportation infrastructure, the social infrastructure stock and the local 
public capital stock from the model specification. 
While our instruments appear to be valid, they could still be weak and 
therefore lead to biased estimates and inference. However we find that our 
instruments are strong. Our test statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
which is referred to the critical values given by Stock and Yogo (2005). The 
critical values are determined by the number of instruments and by the 
number of included endogenous variables, and also by the maximum amount 
of bias that is acceptable, where bias is relative to bias under OLS. The value of 
13.889 lies between the 10% and 5% maximal instrumental variables relative 
bias critical values of 8.78 and 13.97, being close to the 5% value. We conclude 
                                                        
23 Also obtained by the Stata command xtoverid, see Schaffer and Stillman (2010).  
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that the maximum bias in our estimator is less than 10% of the bias that would 
be incurred by OLS estimation. The second element of our test of weak 
instruments relates to the size of the test. If the true size of the conventional 
Wald test, with nominal size of 5%, exceeds this by a certain amount, in our 
case by a maximum of 10%, so that the true size is up to 15%, then we would 
also conclude that we had weak instruments.  The test statistic lies between 
the critical values for 15% and 10% maximal size (nominal size plus size 
distortion), equal to 11.22 and 19.45 respectively. With size distortion of no 
more than 10%, and our earlier evidence of small relative bias, we conclude 
that our instruments are not weak.  
To summarize, our main result given in Table 1 is that public capital 
has a significant positive effect on productivity, with an elasticity equal to 
approximately 0.14, having controlled for employment density, human capital, 
labour efficiency spillovers, and for the significant effects of province 
heterogeneity captured by the fixed effects.  
Effects of public capital stock 
There are several channels through which public investment is usually 
considered to affect regional per capita income. Macroeconomists typically 
emphasize three “conventional” channels. Public investment is considered to 
have a direct productivity effect on private production inputs and to have a 
complementarily effect on private investment. In the short term, however, it is 
hypothesised that public investment might crowd out private spending, and 
adversely affect growth if it persists. In this paper we hypothesise that the 
effect of public capital operates through its effect on worker efficiency, in the 
same way as human capital. However we acknowledge that the effects of 
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public infrastructure may work through diverse channels and may be indirect, 
sector-specific and time-specific. For instance while Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
(1996) find that infrastructure has no significant direct effects, they do find 
evidence that public capital may alter productivity through its effect on the 
number and variety of manufacturing establishments in the local 
manufacturing base. Likewise Moreno and López-Bazo (2007) demonstrate 
that public capital has a greater effect on Spain's industrial productivity than 
on any other economic sector, particularly during the period when Spain 
experienced rapid economic growth, and increased openness to trade and 
greater economic liberalization. Also, as we have indicated above, Moreno and 
López-Bazo (2007) and others suggest a more complex relationship between 
public capital and productivity which involves a negative spillover effect. 
However we are unable to identify this in our model set-up which simply 
captures the net effect of public and human capital and unmodelled spillovers 
as part of the labour efficiency spillover. In this paper we focus on the direct 
effect of public capital, which we find is significant and positive. 
This leads to one additional consideration, the evaluation of true total 
effects in models involving spatial processes, as highlighted by LeSage and 
Pace (2009). Assuming that our parameter estimates apply equally to a single 
cross-section, when we take account of the spillover effects on account of the 
presence of the spatial lag with  in the model, then the derivative 
as implied by Table 1. It can be shown that the total 
effect is given by , and since this is a matrix, it is 
recommended that we consider the mean total effect given by
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, in which N = 47,  is an N by 1 vector of 
ones, I is an N by N identity matrix and as given by Table 1. 
Evaluating this quantity gives an implied mean total effect equal to 0.1692, 
compared with 0.1386 given These results are broadly within the range 
of variation of the elasticities obtained in other papers. Mas et al (1994, 1996) 
obtained an elasticity associated with productive public infrastructures of 0.23 
and 0.08, respectively. However in other papers the reported elasticity is 
lower, as in Goerlich and Mas (2001) which reported an elasticity of 0.02 or 
Boscá et al (1999) who obtained an output elasticity of 0.026 for public 
infrastructures (0.035 in the long run).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have examined the effect of public capital on the 
variation in wage (productivity) levels across the Spanish Provinces, over the 
period 1996-2005. The analysis is underpinned by contemporary urban 
economics theory and the methodology of spatial econometrics, which leads to 
a reduced form in which wage levels depend on „nearby‟ wage levels, 
employment density, educational attainment and public capital. Endogeneity 
and constraints on parameter values lead to an iterative 2SLS panel 
estimation routine. The model supports the theory motivating the reduced 
form, so that there does appear to be increasing returns to scale. There are 
also significant positive effects due to educational attainment which support 
the thesis that labour efficiency is highly relevant to wage variations across 
Provinces. The model estimates also indicate that there is a significant 
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relationship between wage levels and „nearby‟ wage levels, supporting the 
hypothesis of positive spatial spillovers and the necessity for a spatial 
econometric approach.  
Although the theoretical provenance of our paper is somewhat 
different, Ashauer`s hypothesis has not been rejected for the Spanish 
economy during the period analyzed. However we remain cautious in our 
conclusion that public capital is relevant, for we are conscious that the 
estimates may be affected by a more complex relationship between public 
capital and productivity, involving both positive and negative impacts of 
public capital stock, which are concealed when we simply observe is the net 
effect of the spillover of labour efficiency, which embodies the effect of public 
capital.  
Further work is needed to detangle the spillover effects of the variables 
affecting the labour efficiency level, either based on new data or new 
methodology, or both. Therefore in terms of policy involvement at a national 
scale, in the absence of more detailed information on how the spillover effects 
of public investment balance out, we still have to be prudent about the global 
effects on economic activity. In the presence of negative spillovers, provinces 
might be competing with each other attempting to obtain more infrastructures 
than would otherwise be provided. By altering infrastructure investment 
relative to that of  neighbouring regions, each region has the ability to modify 
the size of its infrastructure stock at the expense of its neighbour. If some 
regions follow a “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy, all regions will be dragged into 
fiscal competition. This can lead to gaming behaviour among regions in a 
national economy. If local and national governments ignore the possible 
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existence of negative spillovers and overestimate the positive effects of public 
policies, this can lead to inefficiency.  
The comparisons of the return to different types of infrastructure are 
on our research agenda for the future. 
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